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THE ROLE OF POWER IN THE RULE OF REASON
MARK R. PATTERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the California Dental Association proceedings before the Federal
Trade Commission,1 the commissioners differed strongly on whether the
association had market power.2 The market power issue was not central,
however, to any of the opinions from the Supreme Court.3 To some
extent, the difference can be explained by the more limited nature of
the Court's inquiry. Whereas the Commission was deciding whether
the Association's rules were an anticompetitive restraint, the Court was
deciding only the standard under which those rules should be assessed.
But the Supreme Court's slighting of the market power issue was consis-
tent with the Court's prior jurisprudence, which lends the decision
greater significance.
The Supreme Court's use of market power under Sherman Act
Section 1 has been quite sensitive to the context of its cases. 4 The Court
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law provided valuable financial assistance.
I California Dental Ass'n, FTC Docket No. 9259 (1996).
2 Compare California Dental Ass'n, Opinion of the Commission at 36 ("We therefore
conclude that CDA [California Dental Association] possesses the necessary market power
to impose the costs of its anticompetitive restrictions on California consumers of dental
services.") with California Dental Ass'n, Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Mary L.
Azcuenaga at 26 ("I agree with the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that CDA
lacks market power."). Commission Starek objected to the Commission's use of market
power in its truncated rule of reason analysis. See California Dental Ass'n, Opinion of
Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 26.
3 The majority did not discuss the Association's market power at all. Justice Breyer, in
his dissent, made market power the last of the four questions that he said the rule of
reason comprises, and he only "assumed" that the FTC was required under the rule of
reason to prove market power. California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604, 1618-20
(1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
I In this article, I will assume the usual, broad definition of market power: "the ability
of a firm (or a group of firms, acting jointly) to raise price above the competitive level
without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must
be rescinded." William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. R v. 937,937 (1981). Under this definition, any ability to charge supracompetitive
prices is market power. Thus, market power includes not just the power to restrict output
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has never required a showing of market power in a rule of reason case-
indeed, the Court has said explicitly that no such showing is necessary
when anticompetitive effects are shown 5-and when it has required a
showing of market power in per se cases, the Court has tailored the
requirement to the nature of the power at issue in those cases. Neverthe-
less, some lower courts have required a showing of market power in rule
of reason cases, and it is sometimes claimed that the requirement is a
general one.6 Moreover, the lower courts often equate market power with
market share, regardless of the nature of the particular case before them.7
This contrast prompts two questions. First, why have the lower courts
made so much, and so indiscriminate, use of market power in the absence
of any Supreme Court direction to do so? In part, the reliance on power
(or its absence) is no doubt a result of the persistent advocacy of such
an approach by followers of the Chicago School. 8 Indirectly, though,
the Supreme Court probably also played a role. It did so by focusing to
some extent on market power in horizontal cases, and even more in
merger cases, without suggesting that the role of power should differ
with the nature of the alleged restraint.9 Although the role of market
power in general, and market share in particular, is relatively straightfor-
ward in horizontal cases, the extension of that role to vertical cases is
fraught with problems.
Second, what should be the proper role of market power in rule of
reason cases? In this article, I follow others in contending that the proper
role of power in the analysis depends on the nature of the power that
is relevant to the challenged restraint. 10 I focus particularly on two sorts
but also the power to exclude competitors and the power to increase demand beyond the
competitive level. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45.
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461 (1986).
6 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1997 Term: Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REv. 293, 303 n.43
(1998) ("Indeed, in many circuits a showing of market power or market share is a threshold
requirement for rule of reason cases.") (citations omitted). I have shown elsewhere that
this requirement is not as general or as unequivocal as such statements would suggest.
Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical
History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 1 (2000).
7 See, e.g., Michael L. Denger & M. Sean Royall, Vertical Price, Customer and Territorial
Limitations, in 39TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAw INSTITUTE 723, 797 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1049, 1998) ("To establish that the supplier
imposing the restrictions has the market power to bring about the required adverse effect
on competition, courts have increasingly required plaintiffs to make a threshold showing
that the supplier's market share (used as a proxy for market power) is sufficiently high
that the overall market could be impacted.") (citations omitted)).
I See Patterson, supra note 6, at 13-24.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
0 For citations to other commentary that has taken this position, see infra notes 42 & 43.
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of power that are not well suited to the usual sort of market analysis.
One is informational power: the power that sellers may have to influence
the information that consumers have about the sellers' products. The
ability to control the information available in the market is not closely
related to common measures of market power, such as the sellers' market
shares, as California Dental Association illustrates."l
The other focus here is retailer market power, which has been impor-
tant both in the FTC's recent proceedings against Toys "R" Us 12 and in
several other recent cases.'3 In some retailer cases, as when retailers
collude, traditional market-share measures of power may be appropriate.
In other cases, though, the competitive harm alleged is exclusion, either
of other retailers or of manufacturers that sell through the retailers.
In those cases, market shares may not capture the actual competitive
significance of the restraint. Instead, an evaluation of market power may
require an inquiry into the relationship between retailers and manufac-
turers.
14
The article begins by describing briefly the differing views of the
Supreme Court and lower courts on the role of market power in the
rule of reason. The article then discusses some of the more novel applica-
tions of market power principles in recent cases. These cases appear to
be adopting a more context-specific use of market power, one that
accepts the arguments that power plays very different roles in different
contexts. Finally, the article suggests an approach to the use of market
power that uses an allocation of burdens of proof to explicitly incorporate
these contextual issues.
II. MARKET POWER IN RULE OF REASON CASES
A. THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has always treated market power as only one factor
among many to be considered in rule of reason cases. In Chicago Board
of Trade,'5 for example, it set out a number of factors that are relevant
under Section 1,16 and among those factors then, and in subsequent
II See infra text accompanying notes 50-54 & 82-84.
"
2 Toys "R" Us, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9278 (1998). This decision was recently affirmed
in Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18304 (7th Cir. 2000).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 56-65.
14 See infra Parts III.B. & LV.B.
11 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
16 Id. at 244 ("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
2000]
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statements of the rule of reason, were several related to market power.17
But the focus of the Court in Section 1 cases has always been on conduct
rather than structure-on determining "whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.""8
Moreover, the Court's failure to impose a more specific role for market
power appears to be no accident. In two cases, the Court has rejected
arguments that a showing of market power should be required. 19 In the
most recent of those cases, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,20 the
Court said explicitly that a showing of market power is not necessary
when anticompetitive effects have been shown. The Court explained
that because "the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and
market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential
for genuine adverse effects on competition, 'proof of actual detrimental
effects, such as reduction of output' can obviate the need for an inquiry
into market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects." 21
To the extent that the Court has mandated a role for market power,
it has done so only in particular contexts. Under Section 1, the Court
has required proof of power only in two categories of per se cases,
those involving tying arrangements 22 and those involving exclusions of
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.").
17 For example, in the list of factors that the Court provides in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), the reference to "the percentage of business controlled,"
id. at 527, and perhaps also that to "the strength of the remaining competition," id., point
to factors that are usually considered important in evaluating market power.
1' 246 U.S. at 244.
19 Those who argue that the Court would support such a requirement often cite an
observation that the Court made in Sylvania: "when interbrand competition exists, as it
does among television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation
of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different
brand of the same product." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,52 n.19
(1977). There are three reasons, however, why reading this statement as an endorsement of
a market power requirement would be incorrect. First, it is dictum; the Court made it
only in a footnote defining interbrand competition. Second, Sylvania did not involve an
application of the rule of reason, but a determination of whether the rule of reason or
per se rule was the proper standard. Third, and most important, the crucial question is
not whether market power is important in theory-it clearly is, as the Court's observation
acknowledges-but whether proof of it should be required in litigation-a question on
which the Court's observation sheds no light.
0 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
21 Id. at 460-61 (quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429 (1986);
citing Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason-A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J.
571, 577 (1986)).
22 SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) (stating that
the Court has condemned tying arrangements per se "when the seller has some special
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competitors from joint ventures. 23 And in these cases, the nature of the
power the Court required was tailored to the nature of the cases. In
Jefferson Parish, where the issue was tying market power, the Court said
that "[t]his type of market power has sometimes been referred to as
"leverage, '24 and in Northwest Stationers the Court said that per se treat-
ment turned on whether the defendant "possesse[d] market power or
exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition."
5
George Hay has noted that the latter part of this test-"exclusive access
to an element essential to effective competition"-seems to be a descrip-
tion of a particular kind of market power.2 6
These cases suggest that the role the Court sees for market power in
Section 1 cases has two aspects. First, the role of market power is subsid-
iary to the basic analysis of conduct. This view comes out not only in
Indiana Federation of Dentists, but in the Court's use of power as one factor
among many in evaluating competitive conduct. Second, the role of
market power should be tailored to particular sorts of cases, not applied
as an indiscriminate screen to all Section 1 cases. 27 One can see this in
the Court's requirement of power in the two kinds of per se cases
discussed above. The application of the per se rule in those cases can
be viewed as the ultimate truncated rule of reason: for particular sorts
of restraints, the proof of particular sorts of power is (or substitutes for)
proof of anticompetitive effect under the rule of reason.
B. THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The lower courts have made market power a much more central part
of the inquiry in rule of reason cases than has the Supreme Court, and
ability-usually called 'market power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he
would not do in a competitive market) (citations omitted).
23 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296 (1985) (considering whether the per se rule or the rule of reason was the
appropriate analysis for the expulsion of a member of a joint venture cooperative, and
concluding that the per se rule was inappropriate "[u]nless the cooperative possesses
market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition").
24 466 U.S. at 14 n.20. The Court went on to say that "'[1]everage' is loosely defined
here as a supplier's ability to induce his customer for one product to buy a second product
from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit of the second
product." Id. (quoting 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw T 1134a,
at 202 (1980)).
21472 U.S. at 296.
26 See George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 812 (1992).
217 Another indication that the Court favors specific conceptions of market power in its
per se rules can be found in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
In Sylvania the Court had an opportunity to rely on market power in deciding when the
per se rule would apply to nonprice vertical restraints. Justice White, relying primarily on
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), said that "[i]n other areas
2000]
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they have done so particularly in vertical cases. Indeed, in its recent
appeal before the Federal Trade Commission, Toys "R" Us, Inc. stated
that "[i]n vertical nonprice cases, most courts of appeals have required
a plaintiff to make a threshold showing that the defendant imposing
the restrictions had market power in order to establish the required
adverse effect on competition. 2 8 In fact, only two of the circuits continue
to require, or say that they continue to require, the plaintiff to show
market power in a rule of reason case, 29 but it is certainly true that
market power plays a prominent role in rule of reason cases in the
lower courts.3 0
One wonders why this is so, in light of the Supreme Court's more
limited and context-sensitive use of market power. One possibility" is
the combination in the early 1980s of three factors. First, it was at that
time thatJudges Posner and Easterbrook were making a persistent effort
to make an absence of market power dispositive in vertical cases. 32 They
were aided in this effort by a second factor, the advocacy by followers
of the Chicago School of a more economic approach to antitrust. This
of antitrust law, this Court has not hesitated to base its rules of per se illegality in part on
the defendant's market power." 433 U.S. at 65 (White,J., concurring). The Court, however,
approached the question not by reference to the importance of market power, or by
reference to Sylvania's very small market share, but by reference to the variety of circum-
stances in which vertical restraints can be procompetitive. See id. at 55.
28 Appeal of Toys "R" Us, Inc. to the Federal Trade Commission (Public Record Version)
at 49, FTC Docket No. 9278 (filed Nov. 20, 1997) (citing Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs.,
823 F.2d 1215, 1231 (8th Cir. 1987); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc.,
784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d
1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1983)).
29 See Patterson, supra note 6, at 24-38.
90 Indeed, several appeals court decisions have elevated market power to a privileged
position in another way, by allowing proof of power alone to meet the plaintiff's initial
burden. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The plaintiff
may satisfy this burden by proving the existence of actual anticompetitive effects, such as
reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in quality of goods or services.
Such proof is often impossible to make, however, due to the difficulty of isolating the
market effects of challenged conduct. Accordingly, courts typically allow proof of the
defendant's 'market power' instead.") (citations omitted); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film
Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367-68 (3d Cir. 1996). This is surely incorrect, given that sellers
can possess market power without using it anticompetitively.
31 Another possibility is the frequently made point that market power is necessary for
anticompetitive effect. But this statement, though true, is not at issue. The real question
is whether using evidence of market power is the most effective way for fact finders to
reach accurate assessments of anticompetitive effect. If instead the focus on market power
leads fact finders to neglect more probative evidence of actual competitive effects, or if
it devolves into a focus on market share and causes the disregard of other forms of power
that may be more relevant, it will be counterproductive.
32 Patterson, supra note 6, at 19-24.
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advocacy culminated in the adoption of the 1982 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines,33 which made market power the central issue in merger cases.
These two factors, though placing market power before the courts,
might not have resulted in widespread use of market power beyond the
Seventh Circuit were it not for a third factor. Although the Supreme
Court said in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents
(NCAA) 34 and in Indiana Federation of Dentists that proof of market power
was not necessary, it did emphasize, even if it did not rely on, the
defendants' possession of power in those cases. And, at around the same
time, the Court decided one of its few merger cases specifically on the
basis of the defendants' lack of power.35 It would be possible, therefore,
to read the Court's cases to approve a focus on market power.
Such an extrapolation, however, would neglect the specific context in
which these cases were decided. In merger cases, of course, there is
usually no conduct to evaluate; therefore, a focus on market structure,
and particularly on market power, is inevitable. But it is also critical that
the non-merger rule of reason cases in which the Supreme Court has
discussed market power have been horizontal ones.36 The form of market
power to which courts often turn-market share-is the relevant one
in horizontal cases, where the anticompetitive effect is a restriction of
output. But the harm in vertical cases is generally the product of exclusion
or product differentiation.3 7 Therefore, even if it might be sensible to
focus on market power in horizontal cases, it would not be appropriate
to translate the same approach to every vertical case.
Interestingly, in some of the early lower-court cases that made market
power the central inquiry in rule of reason cases, the harm alleged was
also horizontal, in this restriction-of-output sense. In these cases, the
usual vertical explanations for the restraints were not at issue. For exam-
ple, in Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 38 the plaintiff, a
33 U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,102, at 20,532.
- 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
31 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
3' That possibility is, in fact, consistent with the Supreme Court's limited uses of market
power in per se cases, where the forms of power on which the Court has relied have been
horizontal. That is true not only in the joint venture context of Northwest Stationers, but
also in the tying context, where the sort of coercive power on which the Court has focused
is generally a function of market share, not of product differentiation.
37 See Peter M. Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints:
An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417, 441-43 (describing how the relevant source of
market power in vertical restraints is product differentiation).
38 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982), later proceeding, 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987).
2000]
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terminated distributor, alleged a conspiracy between two other distribu-
tors to seek its termination; the defendant, a liquor importer, did not
defend by pointing to the elimination of free riding or to any other
vertical consideration, but merely said that it sought to reduce the num-
ber of its distributors. General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing
Association39 was similar, in that although the defendant argued that its
rules were intended to eliminate free riding, Judge Posner rejected that
argument and instead characterized the arrangement as a cartel. And
in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,40 the justification
offered was the elimination of free riding, but the free riding was not
among intrabrand competitors, but between individual moving compa-
nies operating within the brand and without it.
Thus, the lower courts' development of a general use of market power
in rule of reason cases was made both against a backdrop of Supreme
Court discussion of market power in horizontal cases and in cases that,
though formally vertical, presented issues that were substantively horizon-
tal.41 Little attention was paid to the appropriateness of extending this
reliance on market power to more truly vertical cases. There has, however,
been a significant amount of commentary advocating a more contextual
approach to the rule of reason in vertical cases. Thomas Krattenmaker
and Steven Salop, in their "raising rivals' costs" article, proposed struc-
tural rules that were tailored to the particular nature of various forms
of vertical exclusion.4 2 And Robert Steiner and Warren Grimes have
argued for similarly contextual treatment of vertical distribution
restraints. 43 These arguments have seen little adoption in the courts, but
recent developments suggest their time may be coming.
1 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
40 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
41 That is, the justifications for the restraints were not those usually made in vertical
cases. Thus, even though Justice Scalia was, in a sense, correct in Business Electronics Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717(1988), when he said that even with a vertical restraint,
"all anticompetitive effects are by definition horizontal effects," id. at 730 n.4, the point
here is that even the plausible procompetitive benefits were horizontal ones. A similar
distinction was drawn by the Seventh Circuit in its recent affirmance of the FTC's Toys
"R" Us decision. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18304 (7th Cir. 2000).
After discussing the evidence offered by the FTC to show that Toys "R" Us had orchestrated
an agreement among toy manufacturers, the court concluded: "That is a horizontal agree-
ment." Id. at *20. In support of that conclusion, it added that the agreement "has nothing
to do with enhancing efficiencies of distribution from the manufacturer's point of view,"
id. at *20-*21, thus looking to the justifications for the agreement in order to help
characterize it.
42 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
43 Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are Vertical
Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407 (1997); Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing,
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III. MARKET POWER AND THE NATURE OF
PARTICULAR RESTRAINTS
Truly vertical restraints, when they are anticompetitive, generally have
one of two purposes, neither of which is to restrict the output of the
sellers that are parties to the restraint. First, the restraint may be intended
to raise the costs, and therefore the prices, of competitors of the parties
to the restraint.4 4 Second, it may be intended to increase the demand
for the products of the parties to the restraint.45 In either case, the parties
to the restraint gain market power, but the nature of the market power
is not due to a restriction of output by the participants, and therefore
is not effectively measured by their market share.
Below I discuss two types of cases in which traditional market share-
based measures of market power have been used, but which actually
present more difficult problems for the use of market power in the rule
of reason. My intent in discussing each of these examples is not to reject
market power as a factor to be considered in the rule of reason inquiry.
It is instead to suggest that a simple focus on a traditional measure of
the market power of the defendant or defendants is not always appro-
priate. This point is not entirely novel; as I indicated above, several
commentators have argued for antitrust analyses that focus on the partic-
ular nature of the restraint at issue.46 My goal here, though, is to make
this point with the particular focus on market power, since that is the
central issue for most courts in these cases.
A. INFORMATIONAL POWER
4 7
In most cases, buyers obtain information about a product in a transac-
tion separate from the ultimate purchase of the product. Consequently,
Intrabrand Competition, and the Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (1995); Warren S. Grimes, Spiff Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality:
Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REV. 815 (1992).
44 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 42.
15 See Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Anti-
trust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1997).
4 See supra notes 42 & 43.
47 The informational power that is the subject of this section is power that is the product
of a particular restraint. In that respect, it is arguably different from the informational
power that was the central issue in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504
U.S. 451 (1992). In Kodak the Supreme Court said that a lack of information about parts
and service costs for expensive copiers and micrographic equipment could prevent those
costs from being reflected in the decisions of purchasers of the equipment. Therefore,
the equipment manufacturer could charge supracompetitive prices, i.e., could exercise
market power.
In the Court's view, the manufacturer's power was a pre-existing characteristic of the
market, rather than the product of a restraint imposed by the manufacturer. I have argued
2000]
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the information transaction can be viewed as taking place in a market
separate from, but vertically related to, the ultimate product market.48
In some informational cases, the possession of power in the information
market is easy to identify. This was so in most of the cases in which
the Supreme Court has considered restraints on information, from the
agreement not to provide dental X-rays in Indiana Federation of Dentists
to the agreement not to bid competitively in National Society of Professional
Engineers. In each of these cases, it was clear that buyers sought the
information at issue, so the sellers' ability to deny the information was
evidence of their power in the information market.4 9
In cases where it is less clear that buyers want information, sellers'
failure to provide it is less persuasive. This point was the Court's implicit
focus in California Dental Association, where its view was that consumers
might find the suppressed information of no value.50 If consumers do
not want, or perhaps if fully informed consumers would not want, the
information that sellers agree not to provide, it is not clear that the
sellers must have power to suppress the information.
Even when a restraint suppresses information that is valuable, and
that therefore is, or would be, desired by consumers, the power inquiry
may not be a simple one. One might think that it would be more difficult
to effect a restriction in the output of information than to effect a similar
restriction in other goods, since information can be supplied more
cheaply. However, in Justice Breyer's California Dental Association discus-
sion of market power (which he "assume [d]" the FTC was required to
show), he did not focus on the capacity to produce advertising. Instead,
elsewhere, however, that Kodak can be analyzed by recognizing that the tie that Kodak
imposed might itself have increased the uncertainty in the market. Mark R. Patterson,
Product Definition, Product Information, and Market Power: Kodak in Perspective, 73 N.C. L.
R~v. 185, 213-31 (1994).
11 Another way to look at this issue is to recognize that information about a supplier's
product is the sort of marketing service that is often provided by retail distributors of the
product. Thus, although the members of the California Dental Association did not use
independent retailers to market their services, the association's restraint on information
could be viewed as a vertical distributional restraint rather than as a horizontal restriction
on output.
49 One might argue that in each case the buyers wanted the information for free, so
the sellers' failure to provide it was due simply to the buyers' unwillingness to pay the
competitive price. This might be a compelling argument in instances where there is a cost
to providing the information, but in these cases the sellers had produced the information as
a byproduct of their other activities.
50 119 S. Ct. at 1614 ("The existence of such significant challenges to informed decision-
making by the customer for professional services immediately suggests that advertising
restrictions arguably protecting patients from misleading or irrelevant advertising call for
more than cursory treatment as obviously comparable to classic horizontal agreements to
limit output or price competition.").
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he emphasized consumers' willingness to respond to it: "Restrictions on
advertising price discounts in Palo Alto [an area in which the association
dentists had a 90% share] may make a difference because potential
patients may not respond readily to discount advertising by the handful
(10%) of dentists who are not members of the Association." 5' The focus
here appears not to be the capacity to provide dental services or informa-
tion about dental services, but consumers' willingness to respond to
information provided only by a minority of dentists.
Thus, the proper focus of a market power inquiry in an informational
case may be less a traditional examination of market share than an
inquiry into consumer responsiveness like that used in consumer protec-
tion cases. That is, the power inquiry becomes, or at least potentially
includes, a wide-ranging exploration into the effectiveness of various
advertising techniques. Antitrust has traditionally focused on supply-
side issues, but the informational issues in these cases depend on the
information available to consumers, which affects demand.52 Because
demand-side effects are not so much an exploitation of market power
as a means of creating it, the issue for an informational restraint will
often be notwhether the defendants have the power to impose a restraint,
but whether the restraint they have imposed has (anticompetitively)
created power.
Moreover, the fact, noted above, that consumers may not want the
information denied means that a market power inquiry may provide no
litigation economies. To determine whether a denial of information is
evidence of market power requires an assessment of whether fully
informed consumers would have wanted the information denied, which,
in turn, requires an assessment of whether consumers would have bene-
fited from the information. But that inquiry is simply an assessment of
the competitive effect of the denial, so that the power inquiry collapses
into an evaluation of ultimate competitive effect. This problem is illus-
trated in California Dental Association. The majority viewed the restraint
as having had the (procompetitive) potential to reduce misleading infor-
11 Id. at 1621 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12 Informational issues also arise in antitrust on the supply side, as in the many cases
alleging information exchanges among sellers that facilitate price fixing. See, e.g., United
States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); American Column & Lumber Co.
v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). Information is also sometimes at issue on the supply
side in vertical contexts. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. AT&T
Corp., No. 94-01555 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 5, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158, 44,166 (1994)
(stating that the merger of AT&T Corp. and McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., would
have "[d]ecreas[ed] competition in the market for cellular infrastructure equipment by
providing AT&T with access to competitively sensitive and proprietary information of
McCaw's principal equipment supplier, L.M. Ericsson").
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mation, while Justice Breyer viewed the restraint as having had the (anti-
competitive) effect of suppressing useful advertising.53 That is, the justices
looked directly to the competitive effect of the restraint, without focusing
on the defendants' power to impose such an effect. 54
B. RETAILER MARKET POWER
The crucial characteristic of vertical restraints is the interaction of
effects in two related markets. Robert Steiner has argued, however, that
antitrust often "employ[s] a 'single-stage' framework, in which the market
downstream from the consumer goods maker tacitly is assumed to be
inert and perfectly competitive." 55 I would prefer to say that antitrust
treats the downstream retailing markets as purely derivative of upstream
manufacturing ones, so that power in the downstream markets is only
possible where there is power in the upstream markets. And antitrust
takes this position, though presumably no one would say that power in
manufacturing markets is only possible where there is power in retail-
ing markets.
In fact, retailing markets are becoming increasingly significant in them-
selves. Retailing has seen much worldwide consolidation in recent years. 6
The increased market concentration has resulted in divestiture require-
ments in many retailing mergers in the United States. For example, the
merger of Exxon and Mobil required "the largest retail divestiture in
[Federal Trade] Commission history," of more than 2000 gasoline sta-
tions.57 And the planned grocery merger of Ahold and Pathmark was
53 See supra note 50; 119 S. Ct. at 1618 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("As implemented, the
ethical rule reached beyond its nominal target, to prevent truthful and nondeceptive
advertising."), id. at 1619 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If the customer does not know about
a lower price, he will find it more difficult to buy lower price service."), id. at 1620
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To restrict that kind of service quality advertisement is to restrict
competition over the quality of service itself, for, unless consumers know, they may not
purchase, and dentists may not compete to supply that which will make little difference
to the demand for their services.").
11 William J. Kolasky, California Dental Association v. FTC: The New Antitrust Empiricism,
ANTITRUST, Fall 1999 at 68, 71 ("The Court is less interested in CDA's market share, than
in the likely qualitative effects of the restraint on competition.").
5 Steiner, supra note 43, at 408.
5 6 See OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Committee on
Competition Law and Policy, Buying Power of Multiproduct Retailers 279 (July 21, 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/Roundtables/buying.pdf> (noting that "with the exception
perhaps of two countries, there has been a significant concentrating trend in retail sec-
tors"). For an empirical study of retailing mergers, see John David Simpson & Daniel
Hosken, Are Retailing Mergers Anticompetitive? An Event Study Analysis (FTC Working
Paper Jan. 1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp216.pdf>.
17 Press Release, Exxon/Mobil Agree to Largest FTC Divestiture Ever in Order to Settle
FTC Antitrust Charges; Settlement Requires Extensive Restructuring and Prevents Merger
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abandoned, at least in part due to the companies' inability to satisfy FTC
concerns.58 In Europe, too, enforcement in this area has been vigorous,
with the European Commission recently suing successfully to block a
merger of two grocery chains.5 9
Even more significant, perhaps, is the increased recognition, again a
worldwide one, 60 that different means of retailing can constitute relevant
antitrust submarkets. In the United States, the most prominent retailing
enforcement action has been the FTC's successful challenge of the Sta-
ples/Office Depot merger.6' There, the FTC argued successfully for a
market defined as "the sale of consumable office supplies through office
superstores."62 Even more to the point, in its recent non-merger action
against Toys "R" Us, the Commission challenged Toys "R" Us's attempt
to disadvantage "a new type of competition in toy retailing posed by
wholesale clubs."6 Similarly, in Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.64 the court
tentatively accepted a market defined as "sales of fountain-dispensed
soft drinks distributed through independent foodservice distributors,"
relying on Staples, among other cases. 65
Retailer market power complicates the analysis of vertical restraints
in two ways, both of which reduce the value of antitrust's traditional use
of the manufacturer's market power as a rule of reason screen.66 Broadly
of Significant Competing U.S. Assets, Nov. 30, 1999 <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9911/
exxonmobil.htm>.
5' See CNNfn, Bitter end to Pathmark deal: Ahold blames FTC for failure of deal,
Pathmark blames Ahold (Dec. 16, 1999) <http://cnnfn.com/1999/12/16/companies/
pathmark/> (quoting James Fishkin, "the FTC's lead attorney on the Pathmark deal," as
saying that "[t]he degree of overlap [of stores] was quite high compared to other deals").
59 Press Release, The Commission orders KESKO OY to divest the daily consumer goods
business of TUKO OY, Feb. 19, 1997 <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.
ksh?p.action.gettxt=gt&docIP/97/135 0 AGED&lg=EN>; see alsoJohn J. Curtin, Jr. et al.,
The EC's Rejection of the Kesko/Tuko Merger: Leading the Way to the Application of a "Gatekeeper"
Analysis of Retailer Market Power Under U.S. Antitrust Laws, 40 B.C. L. REv. 537 (1999).
The United Kingdom's Office of Fair Trading has also done considerable investigation
into retailing power. See, e.g., Office of Fair Trading, Research Paper 13, Competition in
Retailing (Sept. 1997) <ftp://ftp.open.gov.uk/pub/docs/oft/comp-ret.pdf>.
- OECD, supra note 56, at 280 (referring to "the increasing trend of segmentation in
retail formats").
61 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
62 Id. at 1073-81.
6 3 Toys "R" Us, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9278 (1998), Opinion of the Commission at 1,
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9810/toyspubl.pdf>.
6 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13440 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
65 Id. at *2, *24-*25.
- See OECD, supra note 56; Office of Fair Trading, Research Paper 16, The Welfare




speaking, the problems can be characterized as exclusion in the retailer
market and exclusion in the manufacturer market. In the first case, the
retailer uses its power to force the manufacturer to exclude another
retailer. This was the FTC's theory in Toys "R" Us.67 The claim was that
Toys "R" Us used its power as the dominant toy retailer to force manufac-
turers to exclude competing retailers from the most popular toys. In
this case, the absence of manufacturer power makes the anticompetitive
effect more likely, in that the manufacturer will have little ability to resist
the retailer.
The second possibility is that the manufacturer can use a retailer's
power to exclude another manufacturer. This is the effect that has been
alleged in Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. 6 The allegation in that case is
that Coca-Cola has used exclusive-supply arrangements to foreclose a
substantial share of the fountain soft-drink market from competitors
like Pepsi. Coca-Cola presumably has market power, but a manufacturer
without market power could achieve a similar result if it were willing to
commit to sharing the resulting benefits with the retailers. Thus, the
sort of harm alleged in this case could occur regardless of whether the
manufacturer had power.
In each of these cases-whether the retailer exercises its power over
manufacturers, or a manufacturer uses the retailer's power-the relevant
power is that which the retailer possesses over manufacturers or suppli-
ers.69 This power, in turn, is related to, but is not entirely dependent
on, its power over consumers. The Federal Trade Commission made this
point in its decision in Toys "R" Us. Although the Commission said that
Toys "R" Us (TRU) had a large market share of the retail toy market,
it said that TRU's share of that downstream market underrepresented
its upstream power over manufacturers: "TRU purchases such a great
share of all toys and of each toy manufacturer's output that no other
retailer could make up for lost sales volume should TRU decide to
terminate its relationship with the supplier." 70
Thus, the power of foreclosure is measured by the lost profits imposed
on the foreclosed seller. This is not a direct market effect, but is an effect
67 FTC Docket No. 9278 (1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9810/toyspubl.pdf>.
611998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13440 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
69 That is not to say that retailers cannot also exercise power directly over consumers. The
sorts of exclusion discussed here, however, depend on retailers' power over manufacturers.
70 The Commission also said that "without TRU's support, many toy manufacturers will
not pay for an effective advertising campaign, because the manufacturers believe they
cannot attain the necessary volume of sales if products are not sold at TRU." Toys "R" Us,
Opinion of the Commission at 69.
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based on the relationship between the two parties. 71 It is dependent on
market effects, though. Specifically, the power that a retailer possesses
over a supplier is determined by two factors: (1) the extent to which
consumers seek the manufacturer's product from that retailer, and (2)
the extent to which they will go elsewhere for the product if it is unavail-
able at the retailer. The first of these factors is a relatively straightforward
instance of product differentiation: one retailer may be more frequently
used for certain products or for certain manufacturers than is another
retailer. 72
The second factor is somewhat more complicated. It is related to
market power, but is defined by the cross-elasticity of demand for a
manufacturer's product at a particular retailer. When the retailer can
provide another product that is almost as attractive as the excluded
manufacturer's, such elasticity may be great, as the FTC said in Toys
"R" Us:
[O]f great importance in explaining why TRU was so successful in
organizing its boycott, is that TRU, as a very large multi-brand retailer,
has the ability to amplify its own market power by playing favorites-
7! The concept was described in a recent OECD paper:
[A] retailer is defined to have buyer power if in relation to at least one supplier
it can credibly threaten to impose a long-term opportunity cost (harm or withheld
benefit) which, were the threat carried out, would be significantly disproportion-
ate to any resulting long-term opportunity cost to itself. Otherwise put, buyer
power is defined as situations where there is a fundamental difference in negotiat-
ing power between the parties.
OECD, supra note 56, at 281.
The relationship element is emphasized in that the retailer may have the power to
foreclose distribution avenues beyond those in the market directly affected by the restraint.
This possibility is illustrated in the Justice Department's recent challenge to the merger
of Aetna Inc. and Prudential Insurance Company of America. In addition to the typical
merger issues, the government considered the additional impact provided by Aetna's
power, when a dispute arose with physicians regarding coverage under a particular health
plan, to foreclose the physician from additional plans:
A physician's ability to replace, in a timely manner, such lost business is signifi-
cantly diminished when a large number of patients need to be replaced. Because
of Aetna's "all products clause"-which requires a physician to participate in all
of Aetna's health plans if he or she participates in any Aetna plan-a physician
would lose patients from all Aetna plans if he or she rejects the rates or other
terms of any one Aetna plan. Thus, the cost of replacing Aetna patients will be
greater when Aetna plans collectively account for a larger share of a physician's
total revenue.
United States v. Aetna Inc., Revised Competitive Impact Statement, 1999 WL 1419046,
*16 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999).
72 Of course, in that case, the market could be defined as that particular niche, in which
case the retailer would in fact have power. But such market definitions are rare, the recent
Staples and Coca-Cola cases notwithstanding. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066
(D.D.C. 1997); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13440 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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or even threatening to play favorites-among its suppliers. This is a
source of market power that is not available to single-brand retailers
(e.g., an Exxon station or Whirlpool distributor). With multi-brand
dealers, a rejected or disfavored product's shelf space will be given to
that product's closest substitute with little (if any) loss to the dealer.
As a result, the manufacturing firm suffers a significant loss of sales
and may lose even more in relative terms because its competitors will
prosper as a result.
73
A crucial point is that neither of these factors-the share of a manufac-
turer's sales that are made through a particular retailer, or the elasticity
of demand for those sales at that retailer-can be assessed by examining
the manufacturer's market share. Each is a product of retailer power,
but they also cannot necessarily be measured by examining the retailer's
market share. Instead, the particular retailer power that is relevant is
the retailer's power with regard to a particular manufacturer's products.
Evaluation of that power may require an inquiry into marketing effective-
ness that is not dissimilar from that which, as discussed above, is required
for assessment of informational power.
74
Moreover, just as an assessment of informational power may best be
made through a direct evaluation of competitive effects, the evaluation
of this sort of retailer power requires the same sorts of inquiries as are
required in evaluating the competitive effects of the restraint that the
retailer would impose through the use of that power: Has a retailer
favored by consumers denied access to a manufacturer's goods? Has the
manufacturer been able to make its goods available through alternative
retailing avenues without imposing significant costs on consumers?
Because the answers to these questions are found through a direct inquiry
73 Toys "R" Us, Opinion of the Commission at 69-70 (citing 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAw 1648c, at 535-37 (1989)). Moreover, the manufacturer may have little
power to affect this sort of substitution. Particularly where multi-brand retailers are used,
consumers may have developed relationships with those retailers that are stronger than
their relationships with any particular manufacturer:
Consumers would have to be particularly attached to a certain brand to be willing
to switch stores because that brand is de-listed, hence a de-listed manufacturer
will usually suffer a loss of turnover. This is corroborated by a recent INSEE study
showing that for about 60 percent of consumers, the absence of a preferred
brand simply results in a substitution of a stocked substitute. Only about 20
percent of consumers will go to another store to find the missing product.
OECD, supra note 56, at 283.
A similar point was made in Aetna. See United States v. Aetna Inc., Revised Competitive
Impact Statement, 1999 WL 1419046, *16 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999).
71 See Wayne D. Collins, Rethinking the "Quick Look": California Dental Association and
the Future of Rule of Reason Analysis, ANTITRUST, Fall 1999, at 54, 59 (noting that problems
are more difficult "as the challenged conduct moves away from simple restraints on
prices or output to more complicated ones involving product differentiation, information,
or innovation.").
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into competitive effects, it is not clear that in this context a preliminary
inquiry into market power would be helpful.
IV. MARKET POWER AND BURDENS OF PROOF
The plaintiff has the initial burden under the rule of reason, and the
Supreme Court has set out three ways in which that burden can be met,
at least in horizontal cases.75 First, the plaintiff can show that the restraint
is a naked restriction on price or output. Second, the plaintiff can show
actual anticompetitive effects. The third possibility is one that the Court
has established only by implication: the plaintiff can show market power
and conduct that presents the potential for anticompetitive effects. The
"potential" for anticompetitive effect that the plaintiff must show under
this third approach presumably does not require that "the likelihood of
anticompetitive harm is evident," because that could justify condemning
the restraint after only a quick look (i.e., without a showing of market
power) .76
The defendant's options are simpler: after the plaintiff has met its
burden, the defendant must show some sort of procompetitive effect.
In a sense, this is odd, because even if the requirement is interpreted
somewhat flexibly, the defendant will have the same basic burden
whether the plaintiff has shown actual anticompetitive effects or only
the potential for such effects. Of course, one might say that it would be
easier for the defendant to contest the latter burden, which in effect
would lessen the defendant's burden. But the courts appear to require,
even if the plaintiff shows only a potential for anticompetitive effect,
that the defendant show a countervailing procompetitive effect, not that
the anticompetitive potential has gone unrealized. 77
7- See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986). The third possibility
is only implicit because, though the Court says that the purpose of an inquiry into market
power "is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse
effects on competition," id., it does not say what evidence the plaintiff must introduce in
addition to the proof of market power. Some courts appear to state that the plaintiff must
prove only market power. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)
(observing that because proof of actual effects is not always possible, "courts typically allow
proof of the defendant's 'market power' instead") (citations omitted)). It seems likely,
however, that the Supreme Court would require some evidence of anticompetitive conduct.
76 Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors 4 (Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/
ftcdojguidelines.pdf> [hereinafter Competitor Collaboration Guidelines] ("[W]here the
likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the agreement, or
anticompetitive harm has resulted from an agreement already in operation, then, absent
overriding benefits that could offset the anticompetitive harm, the Agencies challenge
such agreements without a detailed market analysis.").
77 See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) ("If a plaintiff
meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or actual anti-
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This peculiarity may arise from a rule of reason scheme that is based
on horizontal cases. With most horizontal cases, the harm, if any, is
caused by a reduction in output, and the potential for such harm is
created by a straightforward combining of market shares. In such cases,
once a significant market share and an agreement that could facilitate
a reduction in output are shown, there is no way to show that the
reduction in output did not in fact occur without knowing what the
market would have looked like in the absence of the agreement (which
might show that the agreement did not in fact reduce output). Because
this is impossible, the defendant must show a countervailing procompeti-
tive benefit.
Vertical cases are different. Because two related markets are involved,
one may constrain any anticompetitive potential in the other. In the
analysis of a distribution restraint, this is the rationale for relying on an
absence of market power in the interbrand market to conclude that the
restraint can have no anticompetitive effect in the intrabrand market.
The question is which party should have the burden of proving market
power, or its absence, in the interbrand market. As noted above, although
it is sometimes said that under current law the plaintiff has the burden
of showing market power, that is not generally the case. Nor should it
be, in that the Supreme Court has said that the plaintiff in a rule of
reason case need only prove the potential for anticompetitive effect.
The defendant, however, should have the option of showing that any
anticompetitive potential of the challenged restraint cannot be realized,
by showing the absence of the relevant form of market power.78 This is
true not only in traditional vertical cases, but in quasi-vertical cases, like
the information restraint in California Dental Association. In all of these
cases, though, the relevant evidence should differ with the nature of the
restraint alleged. For that reason, allocation of burdens of proof, and
competitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct
promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective."). This approach appears to be affirmed
by Justice Breyer in California Dental Association, where he discusses the plaintiff's burden
of showing "the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition," 119 S. Ct. at 1619
(Breyer, J., dissenting), and the defendant's burden of "establishing a procompetitive
justification," id. at 1621.
78 The defendant should also be permitted to show that any harm is balanced by a
procompetitive benefit. Even though this option makes conceptual sense in that, for
example, a procompetitive interbrand benefit could outweigh an anticompetitive intra-
brand harm, balancing the two effects is likely to be impossible. The balancing involved
in a horizontal case at least is done in a single market; in a vertical case it requires balancing
benefits in one market against harms in another. In any event, a benefit to interbrand
competition is rarely actually shown, let alone shown to outweigh the harm to intrabrand
competition. Instead, the existence of interbrand competition is taken as evidence that
intrabrand competition could not actually have been injured-that the potential for
intrabrand harm either does not exist or is not realized.
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particularly of burdens of proof on the market power issue, should be
tailored to the particular harm alleged by the plaintiff.
The discussion below of some specifics of how this approach might
work illustrates, however, that a more realistic approach to market power
can require an extensive inquiry into the competitive effects of a restraint.
For that reason, a preliminary inquiry into market power may not provide
the litigation efficiencies in vertical cases that it can in horizontal ones.
In vertical cases, therefore, it may be more appropriate to forgo the
market power inquiry entirely and inquire directly into the competitive
effect of the challenged restraint. As Andrew Gavil has recently pointed
out, the Supreme Court appears to have established a rule that direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects cannot be rebutted by more circum-
stantial evidence of a lack of market power, such as that produced by
market share evidence. 79
A. RESTRAINTS ON INFORMATION
Traditional horizontal cases, which involve explicit restraints on out-
put, and even exclusion cases like Northwest Stationers, which involve the
raising of rivals' costs, share one important characteristic: they both
involve reductions in industry supply. That is not true for an informa-
tional case like California Dental Association:
If quality advertising actually induces some patients to obtain more care
than they would in its absence, then restricting such advertising would
reduce the demand for dental services, not the supply; and it is of
course the producers' supply of a good in relation to demand that is
normally relevant in determining whether a producer-imposed output
limitation has the anticompetitive effect of artificially raising prices.80
"Horizontal" activity that alters demand cannot be analyzed in the
same way as other horizontal activities.81 The collectivity of the activity
is not always the source of its competitive impact, at least not directly;
power in this context can be more subtle. If the purpose of the restraint
is to restrict the availability of information, the power to do so is deter-
71 See Andrew I. Gavil, Copperweld 2000: The Vanishing Gap Between Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 95-102 (2000).
so 119 S. Ct. at 1616.
81 Cf Kolasky, supra note 54, at 68 (noting that California Dental Association "draws into
question"Joel Klein's "stepwise" approach to horizontal restraints, but "accords well" with
Douglas Melamed's approach to vertical restraints). Kolasky is referring to two speeches
by justice Department officials: Joel I. Klein, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of
Horizontal Agreements, Speech Before the ABA Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy
Program (Nov. 7, 1996) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jikaba.htm>; and
A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Vertical Agreements, Speech Before the ABA Section
of Antitrust Law (Apr. 2, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1623.htm>.
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mined by the participants' willingness to conform to the restriction, by
consumers' willingness to act without the information, and by competi-
tors' inability to respond. These considerations can be connected to
measures of power, though they are not necessarily the traditional mea-
sures of market power.
The implications of these points for plaintiffs' and defendants' bur-
dens of proof can be illustrated by considering two superficially similar
cases, Indiana Federation of Dentists and California Dental Association. The
organizations suppressing information in these two cases were quite
different, as were their means of suppressing that information. Conse-
quently, it would have been appropriate to allow the plaintiffs in the
two cases to meet their burdens of showing a potential for anticompetitive
effect in different ways. (In the Supreme Court's view, the FTC in Indiana
Federation of Dentists proved anticompetitive effect directly, so that there
was no need to consider how the Commission might have shown a
potential for such effect, but here the focus will be on the full rule
of reason.)
Considering Indiana Federation of Dentists first, it is critical that the
Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD) was an organization formed spe-
cifically to impose the restraints that the FTC challenged. The organiza-
tion was a convenient vehicle for a pre-existing agreement to suppress
information, rather than an independent source of power for that sup-
pression. Hence, it was the pre-existing agreement that should have been
the focus, not the organization itself (making the Supreme Court's "quick
look" approach appropriate). The power of the agreement to restrict
information, like that of other agreements to restrict output, was a
function of the collective market share of its participants, making market
share the relevant source of anticompetitive potential.
The California Dental Association (CDA) was a very different organiza-
tion, however. As the FTC discussed,82 the CDA provided its members
82 See California Dental Ass'n, Opinion of the Commission 32-34 (Mar. 25, 1996), (exam-
ining "whether the association has the ability successfully to impose the restriction on its
members" and observing that "dentists place a high value on the benefits of membership
in CDA, whether because of its insurance and educational programs or the reputational
advantage that membership may confer").
The Indiana Federation of Dentists, in contrast, was formed despite the existence of a
traditional dental association. The Indiana Dental Association had itself opposed the
insurers' cost-containment programs, but fears of antitrust liability, and an FTC action,
caused it to cease its organized opposition. 476 U.S. at 449-50. Subsequently, the Indiana
Federation of Dentists was formed, with a more focused mission:
The leaders of the new organization believed that their mandate was to intensify
the IDA boycott campaign. In a report to IDA's Board of Trustees on IFD's
formation, IFD's first President explained:
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with valuable services, so that a member of the CDA might have disagreed
strongly with its restraint, but still complied because it was unwilling to
sacrifice the other services that the organization provided. 83 In addition,
the CDA, as a respected institution, might have had power to convince
consumers (or, say, state regulators who might have objected to its
restraint) that it was not in the consumers' best interests to rely on the
discount advertising that it sought to suppress. 84 Indeed, this sort of
persuasive power might have contributed to dentists' unwillingness to
violate the CDA's rules.
Thus, the CDA had sources of power that could have enabled it to
suppress information even in the absence of a large market share. For
that reason, a plaintiff challenging the restraints of such an organization
should not be required to show power in the form of market share if it
can show power of some other kind. Even without a large market share,
the organization may have the power to suppress information from its
members, and that power may deny information to the consumers of
those members, and may even, due to the respect with which the organiza-
tion and its members are held, cause consumers not to rely on what
information is provided by competitors. To be sure, the plaintiff should
be required to provide evidence of these alternative sources of power
if it chooses to rely on them, but such evidence should be sufficient to
meet its burden of proof.
How, then, should defendants respond? In a case like Indiana Federation
of Dentists, where market share is the relevant measure of power, the
defendants would likely respond with their own market share or market
definition evidence. 85 They would offer this evidence not to show that
[A]bout 80-90% of dentist practices in the Anderson area [IFD headquar-
ters] is covered by one insurance carrier; therefore, the dentists there believe
they need more muscle than organized dentistry can give them. They found
that via a union they could go beyond dental association activities. In their
opinion the union movement will not weaken the IDA but will supplement it.
Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 7, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, No.
84-1809 (U.S. filed Dec. 6, 1985); see also 476 U.S. at 450-51.
83 There was direct evidence of such power, in that some member dentists wanted to
provide the information but were prevented from doing so.
84 Indeed, the CDA, instead of establishing rules, could have advertised its views regarding
advertising, in which case its views would have been entitled to at least some First Amend-
ment protection. Had it chosen this approach, its credibility would have been even more
important than it was in the rule-making approach that the CDA in fact took. In most
cases, a consumer that receives no information will not know by whom the information
was restricted (or even if it was restricted, since no restriction would be necessary if no
one sought to communicate it), whereas a consumer that receives information will often
know its source.
85 Alternatively, it could respond by showing some procompetitive benefit that would
balance the potential for anticompetitive harm.
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their competitors could counter the potential for anticompetitive effect,
but to contest the existence of such potential. That is so, as discussed
above, because in a market share case the potential for anticompetitive
harm is the same as the absence of an ability of competitors to counter
the harm. In a case like California Dental Association, however, where
various forms of power are at work, the defendant would have more
options. With an informational restraint, even if the defendants possess
power sufficient to suppress information that would otherwise be avail-
able in the market, others may possess power that is also sufficient to
counter any anticompetitive effect.
For example, there may be sufficient competitors offering the informa-
tion not offered by the defendants, so that those consumers who seek
the information have access to it. Market share is not likely to be especially
relevant here. In California Dental Association, for example, even if the
dentists who agreed to restrict their use of certain forms of price and
quality advertising made up a large share of the dentists in a particular
market, the small number of other dentists might still have been able
to counter the restraint. If only a small share of consumers relied on
the advertising information in choosing a dentist (which is plausible, in
that it is probably true that many consumers use such information only
in their initial selection of a dentist), it is possible that the dentists who
were not bound by the restraint could have met the needs of those
information-sensitive consumers.8 6 On the other hand, as Justice Breyer
86 On the other hand, although it is possible that only a small share of dentists could
counter the lack of information created by the CDA's restraint, it is not certain that they
would counter it. Cf Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
474 (1992) ("Kodak acknowledges the cost of information, but suggests ... that customer
information needs will be satisfied by competitors in the equipment markets. It is a question
of fact, however, whether competitors would provide the necessary information .... Even
if competitors had the relevant information, it is not clear that their interests would be
advanced by providing such information to consumers."). Moreover, in some instances,
because the exposure of deception is informational, a competitor who produced such
exposure might not itself reap all the benefits. That is, other competitors might also
benefit from the exposure, and would thus be tempted to free ride on the exposure. For
that reason, a competitor might be more likely to invest in such exposure if its own share
were large, because then it would reap a large portion of the resulting benefits. (Where
the informational issue is not deception, but simply suppression, as in California Dental
Association, this may not be true. In that case, a dentist who advertises his or her discounts
or quality is likely to receive all of the business attributable to the advertisements.)
In any event, such a response, because it would be a result of the competing dentists'
decision making, not of their "production" capacity, would probably depend more on the
number of competitors than on their market share. An analogous point is made of markets
for research and development, which are also informational, in the recent joint venture
guidelines of the FTC and Justice Department: "When the competitive concern is that a
limitation on independent decision making or a combination of control or financial
interests may yield an anticompetitive reduction of research and development, the Agencies
typically frame their inquiries more generally, looking to the strength, scope, and number
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pointed out, consumers might be skeptical of information offered only
by a small subset of dentists.
87
Alternatively, an organization like the CDA could argue that in sup-
pressing the information it is acting as the agent of consumers. In a sense,
this was the view taken by the majority in California Dental Association, and
it is similar to the Court's approach to standard setting.8 8 This argument
can be understood in either of two ways. First, it could be interpreted
as a claim that the organization's rule is, in fact, procompetitive. That
seems to be the approach adopted by the Court in California Dental
Association, though it is one the Court has rejected in other cases.89
Alternatively, it could be interpreted as saying that the organization has
no power over consumers, but merely responds to consumers' desires.9°
In that form, it is an argument that the organization lacks market power. 9'
B. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS WITH RETAILER MARKET POWER
It is useful to distinguish two sorts of power possessed by retailers.
Each corresponds to a service provided by retailers to consumers. First,
retailers often provide consumers with pre- and post-sale services in
connection with a particular manufacturer's (or several manufacturers')
products. Such services may include a showroom, service facilities, and
the like. Second, many retailers serve as multibrand shopping centers
for consumers. That is, retailers provide consumers with a place where
of competing R&D efforts and their close substitutes." Competitor Collaboration Guide-
lines, supra note 76, at 17 n.43.
87 119 S. Ct. at 1621 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88 The Court has observed that privately developed standards often have a great influence
on the codes of cities and states, and even can be routinely adopted into law. Allied Tube
& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988); American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570 (1982). The Court has
also emphasized that it is important that statements emanating from standard-setting
organizations "carry with them the assurance that persons in the affected industries [can]
reasonably rely upon their apparent trustworthiness." Mechanical Engineers, id. at 567.
8 See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
90 In that sense, it is somewhat similar to a manufacturer's reliance, in a vertical restraint
case, on its lack of market power.
91 An interesting question is whether if, as in Indiana Federation of Dentists, the plaintiff
can show that some consumers who sought information have been denied access to it,
the defendants should be able to argue that this is not an actual anticompetitive effect
but only a potential one and respond that the potential would not be realized. For example,
the Court could sensibly have viewed the true consumers as the insureds, rather than the
insurers. In that case, the Court could possibly have concluded that receiving the informa-
tion would have caused the insurers to decline reimbursement for treatments that would
have been beneficial (and cost-effective) for their insureds. This approach would be




they can compare the products of various manufacturers and with a
source of information about those products.
Generally, manufacturers have no interest in allowing retailers to exer-
cise any market power they may have in the first of these markets, for
pre- and post-sale services. To the extent that a manufacturer is able,
then, it will seek to constrain retailers in this respect. The second sort
of market power, however, in product selection services, can be useful
for manufacturers as well as for retailers. Indeed, even if a retailer has
no market power in providing this service, in that any attempt to "steer"
customers will cost the retailer some of those customers, a manufacturer
that is the beneficiary of such steering may be able to use some of its
resulting profits to provide the retailer with sufficient compensation to
make such steering profitable.
In any event, as Thomas Arthur has discussed, 92 the argument that
manufacturers will constrain retailer power is reminiscent of the defen-
dant's argument in Kodak that its lack of market power in the equipment
market prevented it from exercising power in the parts and service
aftermarkets. Consequently, it presents problems similar to those that
caused the Supreme Court to reject the argument in Kodak. That is,
whether a lack of power in one market will constrain the exercise of
power in another market is a factual question, and often a difficult one.
Therefore, where power exists in one market-the parts aftermarket in
Kodak, or the retailing market for a vertical restraint-a court should
only accept a defendant's argument that the power cannot be exercised
if the defendant can show, as a matter of fact, that such a constraint
actually exists.
Thus, it cannot generally be said that manufacturers will seek to con-
strain any exercise of retailer power, even where they have the power
to do so.9s Consequently, the role of power in vertical restraints will
92 See Thomas C. Arthur, "Formalistic Line Drawing": Exclusion of Unauthorized Servicers from
Single Brand Aftermarkets After Kodak and Sylvania, 24J. CORP. L. 603 (1999).
(1 The usual argument made for manufacturer control of vertical restraints is somewhat
different. It relies on an absence of manufacturer power, and contends that if manufactur-
ers have no power, they will be forced to constrain their retailers' power, or buyers will
not purchase their products (because of the overpriced retailers' services). But this is not
necessarily true. It might be, for example, that all retailers are charging supracompetitive
prices. Or, in a more likely scenario, a multibrand retailer could steer customers to a
particular manufacturer's products, and the steering itself could both provide the manufac-
turer with market power and give it the incentive to cooperate with the steering retailer.
Douglas Melamed made this point in his speech on exclusionary agreements:
If the manufacturer expects to gain or preserve market power by the exclusion
of its rivals, it can endeavor to induce the distributors to go along with the
exclusionary scheme by sharing with them a portion of the anticipated supracom-
petitive profits. The sharing of supracompetitive profits could take the form
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differ with the nature of the potential harm of the restraint. That is true
of power in both of the markets involved, the market in which the harm
is alleged and that in any vertically related market that has the potential
to constrain the harm. Moreover, depending again on the nature of the
harm alleged, the relevant source of power in either market will not
necessarily be market share. Hence, a plaintiff should be able to meet
any burden it has of proving market power by proving the particular
form of power that is relevant to the harm it alleges, and the defendant
should be able to respond by showing that its competitors have the power
to counter the potential harm. As the discussion below illustrates, this
is not always how the cases proceed.
1. Exclusion from Retailing Markets
Consider first Toys "R" Us. The FTC claimed that Toys "R" Us agreed
with toy manufacturers that the manufacturers would not sell their most
popular toys to Toys "R" Us's new competitors, the warehouse clubs, in
the same form in which they sold them to Toys "R" Us. 94 The FT'C's
theory was that this differentiation of the products sold by Toys "R" Us
and by the clubs made price comparisons by consumers difficult. This
difficulty in price comparison, in turn, reduced pricing pressures on
Toys "R" Us, and gave it market power, or maintained its existing power.
Market share is of no relevance to this form of power, at least directly. 95
Instead, the FIC might have shown one of several things (listed in order
simply of a high price paid for distribution services, or it could be part of the
consideration paid to the distributors in more subtle or complex commercial
arrangements.
If the supracompetitive profits available to the distributor are large enough,
the distributor can be induced to agree to the restraint, even if it is inefficient.
In other words, even if the manufacturer cannot induce the distributor to make
the exclusionary promise by sharing efficient fruits of the transaction, it can do
so by sharing a portion of the supracompetitive profits created or preserved by
the restraint
Melamed, supra note 81.
94 This sort of problem has been explored by Robert Steiner. See Robert L. Steiner, How
Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are Vertical Restraints Efficient? 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 407 (1997). The exclusion of new forms of retailing can prevent those
new, more competitive retailing approaches from taking hold, and in the meantime, older,
less efficient forms of retailing can persist. And until one manufacturer begins to use the
new retailers, the others will have no incentive to do so. This shows that it is interbrand
retailing competition, not intrabrand competition, that is at issue. Whether the same
situation could apply after one or more of the manufacturers have begun to distribute
their products through the new retailers is unclear.
91 It may be relevant indirectly, to the extent that Toys "R" Us's market share makes it
an essential retailing avenue for toy manufacturers. Note, however, that even a large
retailing avenue might not be important to manufacturers if it the manufacturer made
little profit on sales through that avenue (and the avenue provided no other benefits,
such as marketing visibility).
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from those that would constitute something approaching a showing of
"actual" harm to those that would constitute only the "potential" for
harm): (1) that Toys "R" Us entered into an agreement effecting the
differentiation and that it then raised its prices; (2) that Toys "R" Us
entered into an agreement effecting the differentiation and that the
differentiation did in fact make price comparisons difficult (which the
Commission might have proved through survey evidence); (3) that Toys
"R" Us entered into an agreement effecting the differentiation (which
would have a potential for making comparisons difficult); or (4) that
Toys "R" Us had considerable power over manufacturers (which would
give it the potential for forcing the product differentiation).
With the first possibility, where higher prices are shown, there would
be no need to show any sort of market power, because the higher prices
would themselves be the anticompetitive effect. The next two possibilities
directly address the informational issue. In those instances, the F1C
would not show harm directly, but would show the potential of that
harm, in the form of the product differentiation .9 6 The fact of the product
differentiation, not market share, would be the source of market power.
In the final possibility, the showing would not be of the fact of differentia-
tion, but of the potential for it. This showing, unlike the others, could
focus on market share. Evidence of market share alone should not be
sufficient, however, because it would not be tied to any particular theory
of harm.
The FTC did, in fact, introduce evidence on the first three points, but
a significant amount of attention in the case was devoted to market
definition and to Toys "R" Us's market share. (Given that the sale of
different products to different retailers was a form of exclusivity, and
thus a distribution restraint, the usual focus would have been on the
manufacturers' shares.) To a large extent, this was because Toys "R" Us
chose to make a share-based argument. The FFC initially defined the
market generally, stating that "the relevant product market is all tradi-
tional toys. 97 Toys "R" Us argued that the warehouse clubs that its actions
were alleged to have injured "account[ed] for no more than an estimated
1.9%" of this market, 9 so that any harm to them could not have
injured consumers.
90 In another sense, a showing of retailing market power, or an increase in such power,
is only a showing of potential harm because retailing market power can benefit competition
in the manufacturer market. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-52 (vertical restraints have "poten-
tial for a simultaneous reduction in intrabrand competition and stimulation of inter-
brand competition").
97 Toys "R" Us, Opinion of the Commission at 68, FrC Docket No. 9278 (1998) <http://
www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9810/toyspubl.pdf>.
98 Id. at 82.
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It is not clear to what aspect of the FFC's case this argument was
addressed. It does not deny that the products sold by the two retailers
were differentiated, nor does it deny that the differentiation made price
comparisons difficult. It seems to be the sort of de minimis argument
that was made, and rejected by the Supreme Court, in Klor's.99 It certainly
was not an argument that the warehouse clubs' customers did not care
about price, in that the clubs' marketing strategy is based on price, so
one would expect their customers to be more, not less, price-sensitive
than average.
Since the FTC's theory was informational, it seems that to contest it
Toys "R" Us should have tried to show that the warehouse clubs were
able successfully to demonstrate to consumers, through advertising or
otherwise, that their prices were lower. The clubs presumably advertised
to try to attract Toys "R" Us customers, and perhaps Toys "R" Us could
have shown that, even after the differentiation of the products, consum-
ers were aware that the clubs' prices were lower.100 Alternatively, perhaps
Toys "R" Us could have shown that it did not, in fact, constitute such a
significant share of any manufacturers' profits that it had power to dictate
the terms on which the manufacturer dealt with it.''
Antitrust's traditional focus in vertical restraint cases on market share
is no doubt in part responsible for Toys "R" Us's approach. 10 2 As noted
above, antitrust also does not generally recognize explicitly that the
defendant in a rule of reason case should be able to offer evidence that
any potential for anticompetitive harm proved by the plaintiff can be
countered by the defendant's proof that others have the power to counter
that harm. Instead, antitrust focuses on showing countervailing procom-
99 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). The FTC responded,
as one would expect, that the customers of the clubs were entitled to antitrust protection:
The boycott orchestrated by TRU reduced the range of choices available to
consumers and eliminated forms of competition that consumers desired and
would have been able to enjoy absent TRU's policy. Club shoppers were not able
to buy the products they wanted at the clubs. They either had to buy their second-
choice goods (e.g., custom or combo packs of goods) at their first-choice stores
(warehouse clubs) or their first-choice goods (e.g., individually packaged branded
toys) at their second-choice stores (TRU, Wal-Mart, Target).
100 If this were true, Toys "R" Us might also have been required to show that consumers
were not harmed by being required to purchase the toys in the forms in which they were
sold in warehouse clubs to get the lower prices, at least if the FTC alleged such harm. See
infra note 110.
101 Given that the focus of the case was on popular toys, in which manufacturers presum-
ably had the balance of power, one might think that this would have been an effective
approach for Toys "R" Us. But the FTC alleged that Toys "R" Us's power was based on
threats to carry fewer of the manufacturers' less-popular toys.




petitive benefits. Even when a defendant can show such benefits, and
can show that they could not be achieved any other way, 03 balancing
the benefits against anticompetitive harms like those alleged in Toys "R"
Us is probably impossible. 04
The restraints alleged in Toys "R" Us were intrabrand distribution
restraints, and the points made here apply more broadly to other such
restraints. That is, if the plaintiff presents a particular theory of harm,
it should be able to show whatever form of power will create the potential
for that harm. In addition, the defendant should be required to address
that particular theory of harm, if it chooses to argue that the anticompeti-
tive potential will not be realized.0 5 In many cases, though, the plaintiff
103 Toys "R" Us tried to show such benefits by arguing that the clubs were free riding
on its advertising investments, which lessened its incentive for such investments, and that
the incentive could be restored by requiring the clubs to sell different products, for which
free riding would be impossible. The FTC pointed out that Toys "R" Us's advertising was
in large part paid for by the toy manufacturers.
"I4 See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason,
60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 68 (1991) ("Courts, and indeed economists, are ill equipped to
carry out the Supreme Court's instruction to balance the conflicting effects that economic
theory attributes to vertical restraints, much less to determine whether the net result of
a particular restraint is on balance to impede or to promote competition."); Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (observing
that the weighing of effects on interbrand competition and intrabrand competition is
difficult). It has also been noted that courts rarely actually do this, regardless of how the
rule of reason is usually described. See Ginsburg, supra (showing that courts in fact use
several other approaches to avoid the balancing task).
105 For example, a terminated retailer might argue that a manufacturer's creation of an
exclusive territory could increase the remaining dealer's incentive to deceive customers
regarding the manufacturer's product because the retailer would not have to share the
resulting profits with competing retailers. The defendant could respond to such a claim
by arguing that retailers for competing manufacturers' product could easily counter the
deception; if the defendant introduced evidence to that effect, its defense would respond
directly to the plaintiffs theory. A response based on manufacturer market shares would
have a much more attenuated relationship to the plaintiff's theory of harm.
Warren Grimes made a similar point in his presentation of the Classic Car Wax story
as an example of anticompetitive product promotion. SeeGrimes, supra note 43, at 832-33.
Grimes pointed out the lack of relationship between the harm he describes (resale price
maintenance) and market power:
Vertical restraints are frequently harmful to competition. And that harm is often
unrelated to the market share of the producer or retailer. Indeed, the pure
monopolist or producer with a secure market niche is unlikely to engage in
vertical price-fixing: such a producer will be able to gain maximum return by
encouraging the narrow retailer margins associated with vigorous intrabrand
price competition.
Vertical price restraints are far more likely to be associated with producers
such as Classic Car Wax, which lacked upstream or downstream marketing power.
When such producers are unable or unwilling to compete on price, vertical price
restraints become a viable option for buying a loyal dealer network. Up to a
point, this marketing strategy will work to increase the producer's sales, albeit
at the likely cost of consumer demand quality. But as more competing producers
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challenging a vertical distribution restraint simply points to the restraint
and argues that it will cause harm, without specifying what sort of harm.
In that case, courts are correct to allow the defendant more freedom in
its response. For example, if the plaintiff is a terminated dealer, and
simply claims that its termination reduces competition in the retailer
market, the defendant generally is permitted to argue that, due to a lack
of power at the manufacturer level, the anticompetitive potential will
be constrained.
2. Exclusion from Manufacturing Markets
The use of retailer power by a manufacturer to exclude competing
manufacturers is a traditional exclusive dealing agreement, and it is
sometimes said that market share is particularly relevant in evaluating
these agreements. 10 6 In a sense, that is true: the key question is the
fraction of the market foreclosed, which would seem to implicate market
share. But as the discussion of Toys "R" Us above suggests, the ultimate
question, for either consumers or competitors, is not a restriction of
output. Consequently, the market share threshold that is relevant should
not be assumed to be the same as in traditional horizontal cases.
Generally, this issue is addressed through careful market definition.
Consider Pepsico, discussed above. The court there accepted a tentative
market definition as "sales of fountain-dispensed soft drinks distributed
through independent foodservice distributors." The court focused on
the position of fountain sellers, observing that as a practical matter they
were required to use the independent foodservice distributors; to do
otherwise would be to incur additional costs.0 7 Interestingly, though,
fountain sellers were neither the ultimate consumers nor the foreclosed
manufacturers.
From the perspective of the ultimate consumers, beverage drinkers,
the issue was one of choice:108 if they wanted a fountain soft drink (or
a soft drink in a fountain atmosphere), how difficult would it be to get
adopt the same marketing strategy, welfare costs mount and output increases for
individual producers are diluted.
Id. at 853-54.
1 Professor Hovenkamp has observed that in some circumstances, notably "foreclosure"
offenses, "[t]he real 'power' basis of the offense ... is market share, not market power
as such." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLIcY 82 (1994).
117 The plaintiff alleged that distribution through foodservice distributors was the "life-
blood of competitive efficiency in the restaurant business ... and other businesses that
depend upon delivery through foodservice distributors to remain logistically efficient."
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13440 at *48; see text supra note 64.
108 SeeNeil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997).
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that drink? We have probably all had the experience of going from
retailer to retailer, looking for a particular manufacturer's product. In
some of the classic exclusive dealing cases, such as Standard Stations,10 9
the cost of this search was not large because it was clear which retailers
carried which products. But with the rise of large, multi-brand retailers,
the cost of exclusion of certain brands or products can be significant. 1" 0
Antitrust analysis has not yet developed an approach to dealing with
this problem.
In part, antitrust has not focused on the consumer perspective because
its focus in exclusive dealing cases has been on the excluded manufactur-
ers. For those manufacturers also, though, it is not restriction of output
that is at issue. The manufacturer's concern is with the restriction of
profits: it would prefer to be excluded from a larger, but less profitable,
market than from a smaller but more profitable one.' As retailers
become larger and more efficient, they will be better able to extract
price concessions from manufacturers, and the manufacturers may be
more willing to sacrifice sales through the large retailing avenues. If so,
this will exacerbate the consumer choice issue just discussed.
All of this suggests that a more explicit approach to consumer choice
issues may be required as retailer power increases. Given the informa-
tional aspects of choice, it is probably no accident that more cases are
being brought making informational claims. In addition to Toys "R"
Us, discussed above, which involved retailer exclusion, the effects on
manufacturer exclusion of such practices as slotting allowances have
given rise to recent concern. 112 As I have suggested elsewhere, one way
to approach these cases would be to require the plaintiff to show that
the exclusionary arrangement has reduced the value of the retailers'
services to consumers." 3 The retailer's power to remain profitable while
providing less valuable services to consumers would be evidence that it
is receiving compensation (in some form) from a manufacturer in
109 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
11 See supra note 99.
iI Of course, if economies of scale are significant, a larger market is more likely to be
profitable than is a smaller one.
112 See Willard K Tom, Slotting Allowances and the Antitrust Laws, Testimony Before
the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 20, 1999) <http://
www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9910/slotting991020.htm>.
'" See Patterson, supra note 45, at 55-59. Cf McCormick & Co., FTC File No. 961-
0050 (2000), Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, (noting that
"McCormick's supply agreements with customers commonly include provisions that, as is
sometimes seen with slotting allowances, restrict supermarket customers' ability to deal
in the products of competing spice suppliers") <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/
mccormickanalysis.htm>.
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exchange for the exclusion, which, in turn, would be evidence that the
exclusion is creating market power. 4
Admittedly, this approach would require evaluation of difficult infor-
mation effects, effects which are currently not addressed explicitly by
the courts."5 A recent litigated example was RJ. Reynolds Co. v. Philip
Morris Inc.,116 in which Philip Morris was enjoined from providing dealers
with incentives to display cigarettes in a way that made it difficult for
consumers to find its competitors' cigarettes. In that case, the court
stated that " [w] hile visibility and advertising are important in most if not
all product categories in the retail store environment, they are uniquely
critical in the cigarette industry."" 7 The court's analysis, however, did not
focus particularly on informational issues, but instead on share measures,
both in the cigarette market and in advertising space."8
A better analysis would try explicitly to use a more appropriate measure
of point-of-sale advertising "share," which would presumably depend on
how such advertising is perceived by consumers. The factors that would
be important in assessing those perception issues would include not only
the form of the advertising, but its source. For example, with regard to
information about product A, are consumers likely to find that informa-
tion most credible when it comes from the manufacturer of A, from
retailers of A, or from competing manufacturers or retailers?" 19 Answer-
14 Note that this point is consistent with the argument often made that slotting allowances
allow retailers to bear some of the risk of the introduction of new products. The potential
payoff from the risk taken will go to the manufacturer, not to the retailer, so the retailer
is paid to bear the risk.
115 It is easy, therefore, to be sympathetic to the concerns that motivate Thomas Arthur's
proposal that the evaluation of vertical restraints be conducted only by the Federal Trade
Commission. See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust
Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337 (2000). But the costs that must be
considered in evaluating alternative schemes of antitrust enforcement include not just
the costs of incorrect decisions in cases that are brought, but the costs of anticompetitive
effects in cases that are not brought, and it is not clear whether the FTC is likely to have
sufficient resources to police vertical restraints.
1660 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
"7 Id. at 505.
1s Id. at 510-11. The decision, however, was on a motion for a preliminary injunction.
The FTC's analysis of its recent consent order with McCormick & Co., Inc. also empha-
sized share measures, observing that McCormick's discount policies sometimes required
stores to devote 90% of their shelf space to McCormick products. McCormick & Co., FTC
File No. 961-0050 (2000), Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment,
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/mccormickanalysis.htm>. But the FTC's primary con-
cern was McCormick's price discrimination, not the informational issues.
119 The importance of the source of the information is illustrated by the fact that when
the defendant alleged to have used false advertising to violate § 2 in American Professional
Testing Service, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc., 108
F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1997), distributed fliers making false statements about the plaintiff,
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ing questions like this would take antitrust analysis far from its product-
market-share roots, but without the answers, it will be difficult for antitrust
to use market power appropriately in analyzing informational restraints.
V. CONCLUSION
I have suggested in this article that the role of market power in the
rule of reason is ripe for change. Legally, the possibility for change exists
because the Supreme Court has never established a clear role for power
in the rule of reason, nor have most of the courts of appeals. Factually,
change seems likely because of changes in the nature of competition.
Competition among retailers is becoming increasingly important as com-
pared to competition among manufacturers, antitrust's traditional con-
cern. And informational forms of competition have been the focus of
several recent Supreme Court decisions. Informational competition is
likely to become more important with the further development of elec-
tronic commerce.
In these areas, and in other vertical contexts, the role of market power
is not captured by antitrust's traditional focus on market share. In these
contexts the appropriate use of power in antitrust litigation requires a
greater sensitivity to the particular form of power at issue. In some cases,
with that sensitivity to context, market power may still be a useful part
of the rule of reason. In other cases, though, the analysis of market
power may require the assessment of the same facts that determine the
ultimate competitive effect of the restraint at issue. When that is the
case, a particular focus on market power will add little in the way of
either accuracy or efficiency to the broader rule of reason inquiry.
its competitor, the fliers were anonymous. Id. at 1150, 1151-52. See also National Ass'n of
Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1988) (antitrust defendant
sent letter to pharmacists, which was regarded by the Food and Drug Administration as
false and misleading, over the signature of "Marvin A. Heuer, M.D.").
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